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Anthony Nassar, Founder & Principal, Venture Momentum, Inc.
 
  In This Issue
Note from Anthony
Featured Interview – A Lesson in Bootstrapping
Featured Article– 3 Indicators to Help You Wisely Invest Your Scarce Capital
Sneak Preview of Next Month’s Issue
About Venture Momentum
  
June 9, 2004

Vol.1, Issue 5

Published on the second Wednesday of every month

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  Note from Anthony

Dear Reader,

The theme of today’s issue is Capital Efficiency. In essence, this means spending your money wisely and making it last as long as possible without suffocating your venture.

Capital efficiency has become a musical refrain sung by many following the burst of the Internet bubble. Many entrepreneurs and investors have discovered the virtues of capital efficiency in the aftermath of the financial excesses and lavish spending of the late 1990s. While start-up entrepreneurs don’t have much of a choice nowadays because of a tight funding climate, it is important to make capital efficiency a timeless business practice which provides small and large companies alike with the means to achieve desirable financial performance.

Best regards.

Anthony Nassar
Founder & Principal
Venture Momentum, Inc.

 
  Featured Interview – A Lesson in Bootstrapping
 

Chris Frothinger

Today, Christopher R. Frothinger, CEO of InfoCentricity, Inc. will tell how he built his team and products, and acquired marquee customers with a very modest amount of funding.

I worked closely with Chris and his team soon after the formation of InfoCentricity in 2000. It’s my pleasure to be able to share their interesting story in this issue.

Anthony: What brought about the formation of InfoCentricity?

Chris: There was a group of smart and talented people who had known each other and worked together for some time. And there was a concept of a software analytical product and methodology that didn’t exist in the marketplace. We felt that this was the team that was going to put it all together and get it to market.

The climate at the beginning of 2000 was not favorable for venture capital funding. So we decided to start a consulting company and push the consulting revenues towards the development of Xeno®, our flagship hosted (ASP based) software. When the consulting activity fizzled 6 months later due to tough market conditions, we refocused the company on building Xeno, which was solidified by what we had learned from our first consulting customers.

We concentrate on 2 markets right now: financial services and specialty retailers. Both markets build predictive models. In the cataloger space, our customers use Xeno to build response models, lifetime value models and attrition models; ie. anything that will help them make better decisions by knowing their customers’ behavior in advance. For example, if you knew that your customers are unlikely to respond to direct mail, you wouldn’t waste resources mailing to them. In a way, predictive models are akin to scientific fortune telling.

In the financial services space, our customers use Xeno to build predictive risk models. Who’s a good/bad credit risk? Who’s likely to revolve on a credit card? Who’s likely to attrite or transfer balances from their card to another credit card issuer?

The other side of Xeno is a general purpose analytic tool that allows people to better understand their business beyond predictive modeling. This is possible with Xeno because the process of model building is similar to the process of understanding your customer. Many of the profiling steps and techniques applied before the model is built are similar to what people use to understand their business. So Xeno is more than a modeling platform; it’s an entire analytic platform.

Anthony: Do you have a particular philosophy with regard to building the team?

Chris: When we started the company in early 2000, it was hard to find funding. And customers were reluctant to spend money. It was going to be a very hard road and we could not afford to make hiring mistakes. Our philosophy was to get people who had worked well together in the past, understood the problem we were trying to solve, and realized that it may take years to reach success. Getting discouraged after a year or two was not an option. Luckily the core founders had a rich network of people matching our criteria to draw from.

This approach enabled us to know how people will react to certain situations: highs and lows, compensation, recruiting, product development, etc. In an early stage company, you have 10 or 15 different things to work on instead of one. You don’t get to specialize. If you understand who your employees are before they come on board, you have a better chance of them working out in the long run.

I should add that many senior people in the company were, from a financial standpoint, either retired or in a position to take the risk. So they were willing to work for sweat equity, which as you can imagine was tremendously advantageous to our cash flow.

Anthony: At which point did you become confident that customers will buy Xeno?

Chris: We got the most traction about this time a year ago. Prior to that, we had released version 1.0 and shown it to a lot of people. We had some initial success in the catalog and retailer space. However, the product wasn’t mature enough for the financial services industry.

In Q1 of 2003, we launched our version 2.0, Xeno Pro™, which was a reflection of having listened to our customers and prospects, and implementing the features they had asked for. It’s when we started showing Xeno Pro to people early last year that we knew we had something. We were getting invited back, and customers were paying to evaluate the software. That’s when momentum really kicked in. The significance of this is that we were 3.5 years into the company.

Anthony: Who are your customers?

Chris: We have 12 customers in financial services and retail. They range from $1B to hundreds of billions in assets and include one of the top 5 consumer banks in the country, and two of the top 10 credit card issuers.

Anthony: Describe your sales process.

Chris: One of the things we have focused on in the last 12 months is our sales process. This is a 3-phase process that I think is unique because of the risks involved.

In the first phase, we meet with prospects and tell them about InfoCentricity. We then show them Xeno on a generic data set. We’re actually showing them the real software, not a canned slide show. It’s like live TV - anything can happen. That’s usually enough to impress them.

In the second phase, we demonstrate the product using their data. Other companies are reluctant to do this because of the costs, risks and uncertainties associated with this kind of a demo. Xeno is built to thrive in this sort of environment.

The third phase is what we call Xeno Boot Camp. In essence, it’s a paid evaluation of our software involving a significant amount of money. When you give someone a trial account, they tend not to test it out if they haven’t paid for it. Boot Camp lets them try the product out for a month including a week of in depth training at our offices. Xeno may be easy to use but it’s solving hard problems. By bringing people in and immersing them in the product for a week, they go away for the rest of the 4 weeks knowing how to evaluate it. We have almost 100% conversion rate. In fact, most of our current customers have gone through Boot Camp.

Boot Camp also allows us to focus on the right prospects. If someone isn’t willing to pay for a Boot Camp, they’re probably not going to buy the product. This brings me to our approach with respect to prospect selection. When we were showing Xeno initially, we were careful to target the early adopters. If in the first phone call or the first meeting we didn’t see their faces light up, we would put them on hold until the following year. This year, we’re going back to some of those prospects. Now that we’ve secured 12 customers, prospects in the later stages of adoption are more likely to start taking a look at what we have.

For an early stage start-up, it’s critical to focus on picking the right customer from the start. If you get the wrong customers early on and spend too much time convincing and selling to them, they are not going to help your cause.

Anthony: How did you validate your products?

Chris: When we took version 1.0 to the market, I’d say it wasn’t validated. What we heard was: it’s a good start but there are some definite areas of “must haves” before people will take it seriously. So we took all that feedback and used that as a driving force for version 2.0.

Beyond validation, a lot of it was instinct. We were the first judges of the validation process. Did the product pass our test? We knew with 1.0 that for a serious risk management shop or a bank, it was a little bit light. The real validation came when we got our first large financial services customer.

The one thing that got us in the door with 1.0 is that it wasn’t a slide show. Everything that is in 1.0 is in 2.0. So it wasn’t that we put things there that customers didn’t want. They just wanted more. If we had done it in a vacuum, it’s possible that we may have gone in the wrong direction. When we came back to those prospects with 2.0 including everything they asked for, it was hard for them to say no. There’s probably 3 or 4 instances in the case of versions 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 where prospects had asked for explicit features and within 6 months, when they saw them in there, they bought it. That’s another advantage of being an ASP. We can do the round of development and deploy functions and features very quickly.

We’re a market driven company. People who are going to buy the product are the ones who will tell us what the product needs to have. We have our own ideas, but we look for a champion in our current customers or prospects before that new feature makes it on the list. Our analytic services professionals are our power users and they definitely influence or drive the product. However, they still need to find a customer sponsor to get a new feature on the list.

Anthony: How are you different from your competition?

Chris: First and foremost it’s our product and technology. Xeno has the advantage of delivering analytics at a very high speed. It also takes a lot of the syntax and coding out of advanced analytics, so statisticians and analysts can really focus on looking at the numbers and the analysis instead of having to worry about writing programs. The analogy our customers use is: we’ve taken advanced analytics from DOS to Windows®.

We’re also different in the way we deliver the product. Our customers access our software via the internet using a web browser. This delivery method helps a great deal in lowering the deployment and IT support costs. We are able to turn customers on for $0 cost on our side and very little cost on their side, other than buying the product itself.

Finally, we take a hands on approach and are easy to work with. We are open with our technology and how it works. We don’t take a black box approach.

Anthony: How have you funded your operation?

Chris: Initially, consulting revenues helped pay the rent. The founders also dipped into their own pockets. After we built Xeno 1.0 and secured a beta customer, we raised around $0.5M in a series A from 3 of the 4 Fs (friends, families and founders, no fools). That money was used to hire our first salesperson, an analyst, and cover other operating expenses. It lasted us 2 years.

We closed a Series B angel round at the end of Q1 2004 for just over $1M.

Anthony: Are your cash flow positive?

Chris: We have been cash flow positive for the last 3 quarters. Some of that was due to deferring salaries (as we weren’t all receiving full salaries). Since January 1st of this year, the entire team is near market salaries, and we are still cash flow positive.

Anthony: Do you anticipate ever needing VC money?

Chris: If we decide on an IPO, we’ll do a series C. Even though we went the friends and family route, we have established connections with the VC community. We keep those relationships alive. They were very friendly and very encouraging as we were working on the series B round. They basically told us what the state of the union was, ie. they were taking care of their portfolio companies. We were doing well enough, and they were kind enough to tell us: you don’t want our money.

As long as we stay on the current path, which means staying private or looking for partners, there really isn’t a motivation for a Series C round of VC money.

Anthony: Can you share a war story?

Chris: We were waiting for data from a prospect. They were supposed to send it on a Friday so we would have some time to look at it, load it into Xeno and get ready to show it on the following Tuesday. Friday rolled around and we didn’t have any data. Jeff the COO and I got on a plane and flew out to New York. By the end of business on Monday, there was still no data from the prospect.

We get in the car and start driving to the presentation on Tuesday morning when we get a call from the head of our Analytic Services group in California. The data had just come over at 6 am PST and our meeting was set to start 2 pm EST. She was up, got the data, processed it and put it on a server where I could grab it. I had just invested in one of these high tech cellular modems for my laptop. While crossing a bridge going over to Long Island, I was downloading this sample test data onto my machine. This was quite unnerving as the dataset was large, and the signal could have dropped at any moment, losing the data transfer. Luckily, we got the data loaded.

We then found a café and spent the next hour looking at the data, processing it and performing the analysis using Xeno on the dataset until my battery died. At this point we had to go to the customer site to see if we could find some power. We got into the conference room a little early and finished up the data analysis by the time everyone came to the meeting. The first thing they said was: we really apologize for getting the data to you so late. We were looking forward to seeing you demo with it. When we told them that we’ve got it and we’re ready, they were blown away. We showed them the level of the analysis that we had performed – in literally a 2-hour window, we had developed 12 or 13 versions of a model, done a segmentation analysis, a series of validations, and showed them 4 or 5 things they didn’t know. Everyone left the room silent. We now have a great prospect.

Ironically enough, we told that story to another prospect. They tried to see if they could simulate it, and succeeded. We had their data for only 12 hours. It was with much more complex data and a much more complex problem, but we were able to do it again. I want to be careful not to promote this. The reality is that there is no other product out there that would take that challenge. One of our tag lines is Analytics at the Speed of Business. You need to be able to analyze data this quickly if you want to impact your business decisions.

Anthony: Do you have any words of advice for your fellow entrepreneurs?

Chris: Make sure you’re committed. Do your homework. Make sure you know more about the market you’re entering than the people you’re selling to. You need to have domain expertise and know the market you're serving. Xeno is a horizontal product that can be used in a variety of industries including telecommunications and healthcare. We aren’t going after these markets yet. Instead, we are focusing on financial services because this is where we currently have the most domain expertise.

Bio

Christopher R. Frothinger
CEO and Chairman, InfoCentricity, Inc.

In February 2000, Christopher Frothinger co-founded InfoCentricity to solve the business intelligence problems that businesses face when transforming their data into actionable information. As Chairman and CEO, Frothinger leads the organization, sets its entrepreneurial spirit, and provides the driving force behind its business, marketing, and product development strategies.

Frothinger has over 12 years of experience in solving business intelligence challenges in retail and financial services industries. Prior to co-founding InfoCentricity, he held relationship marketing, advanced analytics, technical sales and project management positions at Topica, E.piphany, Charles Schwab, Nations Bank, and Fair, Isaac. Frothinger holds a BS in Statistics from the School of Mathematics at California Polytechnic State University.

 
  Featured Article– 3 Indicators to Help You Wisely Invest Your Scarce Capital

Do you systematically run some numbers before investing in a piece of equipment, the development of a new product, or the launch of a new marketing campaign?

If you don’t, you’re not alone. But if you don’t, how can you tell whether the money you are investing is ultimately adding value to your venture? After all, isn’t increasing the value of your start-up one of your primary objectives, second of course to having tremendous fun doing it?

In today’s article, we’ll look at a case study involving a fictitious capital efficient start-up (“CapEf”) that produces constantly changing color collateral. The output is currently generated by an outside printing service for a non-trivial cost. CapEf’s CEO, Julie, is contemplating the idea of bringing the process in-house by acquiring a quality color laser printer in an effort to achieve substantial cost savings for this activity. She is going to prepare a feasibility analysis resulting in 3 feasibility indicators that will help her make a decision. Julie expects the useful life of the printer to be 5 years, and will therefore choose this same period as a time horizon for her analysis.

Below we will discuss Julie’s summary findings. The detailed metrics for this analysis are available online.

CapEf prints 125 pages once a month on high gloss 8.5”x11” stock, and expects the volume to grow 20% per year. The average marginal cost of the printing service is $1.80/page.

The cost of acquiring the printer - including sales tax, 3-year onsite protection, network installation, and training - is $3,500. Card stock cost is 60c/page. In addition, the black toner costs $160 and each of the 3 color toners costs $220 for a yield of 5,000 pages. This results in an average marginal cost per page produced in-house of 76c.

Julie can now develop a 5 year cash flow projection for each of the 2 scenarios – printing service and in-house processing – and compare the two cash flows as shown below. She will ignore the effects of income taxes on her cash flow analysis:

The above net cash flow figures are quite revealing. At first glance, the acquisition of the color printer could very well be a good move, since the negative cash flow experienced in Year 1 - principally due to the acquisition of the printer - is largely offset by the positive cash flow in Year 2. And healthy positive cash flows in years 3, 4 and 5 come to supplement the encouraging results from year 2.

But how does this investment fare relative to CapEf’s investment strategy and required rate of return?

This is what Julie is going to find out by computing the following 3 feasibility indicators. She will be able to make a decision only after she has compared these 3 feasibility indicators with CapEf’s investment guidelines as set by its Board of Directors:

  1. Payback Period (PB): This is the period needed to recover the initial capital investment. In this case it will take 1.66 years to recover the total acquisition cost of the printer. Julie will consider this information carefully in her decision, as it tells her how long the invested funds will be tied up in this project. However, she will keep in mind that this method ignores all cash flows beyond the PB, as well as the time value of money. We will revisit the suitability of this PB value later in this article.
     
  2. Net Present Value (NPV): This is the sum of the cash flows in Years 1 through 5 after they've been discounted back to the present using CapEf’s cost of capital as discount rate. CapEf has a total of $10,000 in common stock and $490,000 in preferred stock - both requiring a 40% return - and a debt of $100,000 costing an effective after tax rate of 10%. This results in an average cost of capital of 37%, and an NPV of $2,352. A positive NPV is a desirable outcome as it indicates the existence of a “cash flow surplus” over and above that provided by the minimum required rate of return of 37%, which is implied by the cost of capital.
     
  3. Internal Rate of Return (IRR): This is the discount rate that would constrain the Net Present Value to equal 0. In the case of CapEf, the IRR is 148%, which is significantly higher than its average cost of capital. In other words, the savings realized from processing the printing in-house generate a return that is more than 7X that of the company’s required rate of return.

    The last step in Julie’s analysis is a comparison between the values of the 3 feasibility indicators and the investment guidelines set by CapEf’s Board of Directors. In order to factor the risks associated with the various projects undertaken by CapEf, its Board has set somewhat tough investment guidelines:

  • PB must be less than or equal to 2 years.
     
  • NPV must be greater than the initial investment times 30% - $1,050 in this case.
     
  • IRR must be 50% higher than the average cost of capital – 56% in this case.

Julie concludes that the project fulfills all the above conditions and is a go! Using conditional formatting in her spreadsheet, she summarizes her findings as follows, (in green are all the results that passed the investment guidelines):

However, before giving the green light for this project, Julie finds out from her Director of Marketing that the monthly volume was erroneously reported as 125 pages instead of 80 pages. She reruns the analysis and finds new values for the feasibility indicators:

Based on the Board’s investment guidelines, Julie must reject the project because it fails the PB and NPV tests which are displayed in red cells.

Using a couple of what-if-scenarios, she determines that a monthly volume of 100 pages would be sufficient to make the project viable, as depicted in the table below. She expects to reach such a volume in 3 months and may obtain approval from the Board to override the guidelines, considering that the indicators are at a very close distance from the allowed threshold of 2 years PB, $1,050 NPV and 56% IRR.

I hope that this case study sheds some light on the insights you can acquire prior to making an investment decision simply by performing a feasibility study, and deriving certain meaningful indicators. Please note that this case study was simplified for the sake of this article. More complex considerations come into play if you are taking into account the effects of taxes on the investment, contemplating mutually exclusive projects, or if the search for the IRR yields multiple values.  

 
  Sneak Preview of Next Month’s Issue

Will Accounting Changes Impact The Fate of Stock Option Compensation? In next month's interview, William R. Zimmerer, Director of Human Resources Services with PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), will give an overview of the proposed accounting treatment of stock options and discuss how entrepreneurs can abide by these new rules while continuing to attract and retain the high talent that is essential for the success of their start-ups.

 
  About Venture Momentum

At Venture Momentum, Inc., we work with start-up entrepreneurs who wrestle with finance and accounting. We help them put together the pieces of their financial puzzle and lay a solid foundation to successfully raise capital, manage growth and achieve liquidity. To learn more, give me a call at 1.415.897.0195 or visit http://www.venturemomentum.com


Disclaimer: The information in the e-zine (the "Information") is current as of the date of the issue shown at the top of the e-zine. The Information is intended solely to illustrate general concepts and guidelines on various business subjects. It may not apply to specific situations. The Information does not constitute accounting, financial, tax, legal or other professional advice. You are urged to consult with a qualified professional who can understand your specific situation and advise you accordingly. No Information creates a warranty. All Information and links to other websites are provided on an ‘as-is’ basis without any warranties, express or implied, including warranties of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose. In no event shall Venture Momentum, Inc., its authors, publishers, contributors and editors be liable for any indirect, incidental, special, consequential, or punitive damages of any kind whatsoever arising out of your use of this e-zine, the Information, and/or links to other websites regardless of the cause of action.
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